Secure Regularized Zero Forcing for Multiuser MIMOME Channels by Asaad, Saba et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
91
2.
00
48
6v
1 
 [c
s.I
T]
  1
 D
ec
 20
19
Secure Regularized Zero Forcing for Multiuser
MIMOME Channels
Saba Asaad∗, Ali Bereyhi∗, Ralf R. Müller∗, and Rafael F. Schaefer†
∗Institute for Digital Communications, Friedrich-Alexander Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany
†Information Theory and Applications Chair, Technische Universität Berlin, Germany
{saba.asaad, ali.bereyhi, ralf.r.mueller}@fau.de, rafael.schaefer@tu-berlin.de
Abstract—This paper proposes a new linear precoding scheme
for downlink transmission in MIMOME channels, referred to as
secure regularized zero forcing. The scheme modifies regularized
zero forcing precoding, such that the beamformers further sup-
press the information leakage towards the eavesdroppers. The
proposed scheme is characterized in the large-system limit, and
a closed-form expression for the achievable ergodic secrecy rate
per user is derived. Numerical investigations demonstrate high
robustness against the quality of eavesdroppers’ channel.
Index Terms—MIMOME channels, linear precoding, physical
layer security, large-system analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Conventional precoding schemes in multiple-input multiple-
output multiple-eavesdropper (MIMOME) channels [1] are of-
ten linear and independent of eavesdroppers’ channel state in-
formation (CSI) [2]–[4]. The linearity constraint is mainly im-
posed for computational tractability. The independency from
eavesdroppers’ CSI further follows the fact that even simple
beamforming towards the legitimate receivers suppresses the
signal at the eavesdroppers effectively when the density of
these malicious terminals in the network is low. In the asymp-
totic regime, this latter behavior is referred to as secrecy-for-
free [5], [6] indicating that in massive multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) wiretap settings [7] with a fixed number of
eavesdroppers, the information leakage vanishes as the num-
ber of antennas grows large, by using simple linear precoders.
Despite the above justifications, taking eavesdroppers’ CSI
into account at the precoder can result in significant perfor-
mance enhancement, specially when 1) the density of mali-
cious and legitimate terminals in the network is moderate or
high, and 2) the quality of signals received by eavesdroppers
is comparable to that of legitimate users. Such scenarios are
likely to occur in current and next generations of mobile net-
works, due to the high number of mobile devices.
A. Contributions
In this paper, we propose a new linear precoding scheme for
downlink transmission in MIMOME channels. The precoder
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follows the least-squares based approach, developed in [8]–
[10], and extends the regularized zero forcing (RZF) precod-
ing scheme [11] to MIMO systems with multiple eavesdrop-
pers. To study the performance of the proposed scheme, we
derive a closed-form expression for the achievable secrecy rate
per user in the system when the number of transmit antennas,
legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers grow large with fixed
ratios. Our large-system analysis extends the earlier results in
[2], [12] to the larger scope, and depicts tight consistency with
simulations. Numerical investigations show that in contrast to
RZF precoding, the proposed scheme is more robust against
the quality of eavesdroppers’ channel and report a significant
performance gain when the quality of the channel to the eaves-
droppers is better that that of legitimate users.
B. Notations
Throughout the paper, scalars, vectors, and matrices are rep-
resented by non-bold, bold lower case, and bold upper case
letters, respectively. The real axis and complex plane are
shown by R and C, respectively. HH, H∗, and HT are the
conjugate transpose, conjugate, and transpose of H, respec-
tively. ‖H‖F further denotes the Frobenius norm ofH. log (·)
is the binary logarithm, and [x]+ := max{0, x}. Expectation
is denoted by E {.}, and CN (η, σ2) represents the complex
Gaussian distribution with mean η and variance σ2. For
brevity, the set {1, . . . , N} is abbreviated by [N ].
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a Gaussian multiuser MIMO wiretap channel
with a base station (BS), K legitimate receivers and J eaves-
droppers. The BS is equipped with a transmit array of sizeM ,
and the receiving terminals, i.e., the legitimate receivers and
the eavesdroppers, are single-antenna. The system is assumed
to perform in time-division duplexing (TDD) mode, and hence
the uplink and downlink channels are reciprocal. The CSI is
estimated in uplink training mode and is known at the BS, as
well as the receiving terminals.
A. System Model
The BS intends to transmit messagesmk ∈
[
2NRk
]
, for k ∈
[K], confidentially to legitimate receivers k. To this end, mk
is first encoded into a codeword of length N , i.e. [sk (1) , . . . ,
sk (N)], and then transmitted within N transmission intervals
over the channel as follows: At time instant n, the BS maps the
encoded vector s (n) = [s1 (n) , . . . , sK (n)]
T
to the transmit
vector x (n) ∈ CM via the precoder Prc{·} : CK 7→ CM , i.e.
x (n) = Prc{s (n)}, and transmits it via the antenna array.
We assume that the channel experiences quasi-static fading,
such that its coherence time interval is larger than N transmis-
sion intervals. Let hk ∈ CM contain coefficients of the uplink
channel between legitimate receiver k and the BS. Due to the
channel reciprocity, the receive signal in interval n reads
yk (n) = h
T
kx (n) + wk (n) (1)
where wk (n) is complex white Gaussian noise with zero mean
and variance σ2k , i.e., wk (n) ∼ CN
(
0, σ2k
)
. After N intervals,
the receiver recovers mˆk = φk ({yk (n)}), where {yk (n)} =
{yk (1) , . . . , yk (N)} and φk (·) denotes the decoder.
For j ∈ [J ], the j-th eavesdropper observes
zj (n) = g
T
j x (n) + vj (n) (2)
by overhearing the channel. Here, gj ∈ C
M denotes the chan-
nel from the j-th eavesdropper to the BS, and vj (n) is additive
white Gaussian noise which reads vj (n) ∼ CN
(
0, ρ2j
)
.
To guarantee secure transmission, we consider the worst-
case scenario in which the eavesdroppers are cooperating. In
this case, the secrecy rate tuple (R1, . . . , RK) is said to be
achievable, if there exist a sequence of encoders and decoders,
indexed by N , such that
lim
N↑∞
max
k∈[K]
{Pr [φk ({yk (n)}) 6= mk]} = 0 (3a)
lim
N↑∞
1
N
I (S (m1, . . . ,mK) ; {z1 (n) , . . . , zJ (n)})=0 (3b)
for all S (m1, . . . ,mK) ⊆ {m1, . . . ,mK}, where S (·) is a
subset of user messages. The constraint in (3a) guarantees the
reliability of transmissions towards the legitimate receivers.
Moreover, (3b) indicates that the signals received by the eaves-
droppers leak no information about any subset of the transmit
messages.
B. Achievable Secrecy Rate with Linear Precoding
For linear precoders, the transmit vector is written as
x (n) =Ws (n) (4)
for some precoding matrixW = [w1, . . . ,wK ] satisfying the
transmit power constraint E
{
tr
{
x
H
x
}}
/M ≤ P . The vector
wk ∈ C
M , for k ∈ [K], is referred to as the precoding vector
of legitimate receiver k. Without loss of generality, we assume
that E
{
s (n) sH (n)
}
= I.
Following the discussions in [2], [13], the secrecy rates
Rk =
[
log
(
1 + SINRk
1 + ESNRk
)]+
(5)
are shown to be achievable for k ∈ [K], where
SINRk =
|hTkwk|
2
σ2k +
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
|hTkwj |
2
, (6a)
ESNRk = ‖KEveGwk‖
2 (6b)
G = [g1, . . . ,gJ ]
T
and KEve = diag {1/ρ1, . . . , 1/ρJ}. In
the sequel, we consider the achievable rates in (5) as the metric
to quantify the secrecy performance of the system.
The main goal of this study is to design an effective lin-
ear precoding scheme which takes into account the secrecy
restrictions imposed by eavesdroppers. We address this ob-
jective by modifying RZF precoding [11], such that the infor-
mation leakage to the eavesdroppers is efficiently suppressed
at the precoding stage. For sake of brevity, we drop the time
index, i.e. n, throughout the derivations in the remaining parts
of this paper.
III. SECURE RZF PRECODING
In RZF precoding, the precoding matrix reads
Wrzf (ζ) =
√
P
βrzf (ζ)
A (ζ) (7)
for the shaping matrix
A (ζ) = HH
(
HHH + ζ IK
)−1
(8)
tuned by the regularizer ζ and the scaling factor
βrzf (ζ) =
1
M
tr
{
A (ζ)AH (ζ)
}
(9)
which guarantees the satisfaction of the transmit power con-
straint. Here, H=[h1, . . . ,hK ]
T
denotes the vector downlink
channel. The shaping matrix in (8) performs regularized chan-
nel inversion. At ζ = 0, RZF precoding reduces to the zero-
forcing scheme. In general, ζ is tuned such that a given per-
formance metric, e.g. ergodic sum rate, is optimized.
A. Alternative Formulation of RZF Precoding
RZF precoding is alternatively observed as the regularized
least-squares (RLS) solution to the following linear regression
problem: Find matrix W, such that the linear expansion Hx
with x =Ws approximates an scaled version of s, i.e. ψs for
some ψ, with minimum least squared error (LSE), subject to
E
{
‖x‖2
}
≤ P . Following the method of RLS, the solution
to this problem is given by minimizing
RSS (W) := Es
{
‖HWs− ψs‖2
}
, (10)
known as the residual sum of squares (RSS), penalized by the
power constraint. In other words,W is found by
W = argmin
X∈CM×K
RSS (X) + ζ Es
{
‖Xs‖2
}
(11a)
= argmin
X∈CM×K
tr
{
XH
(
HHH+ ζIM
)
X− 2ψℜ{HX}
}
= ψ A (ζ) (11b)
where ζ is a Lagrange multiplier. By considering the transmit
power constraint, (11b) reduces to (7). Extension of this RLS
based approach to other constraints leads to generalized least
squared error (GLSE) precoding which has been proposed and
studied in [8]–[10].
B. RLS-Based Precoding with Security Constraints
Following the RLS interpretation of RZF precoding, the se-
crecy constraint can be further imposed at the transmit side
by penalizing the RSS term. To illustrate this point, let
fEve (W) : C
M×K 7→ R+0 (12)
quantify the information leakage when the linear precoderW
is employed. Let fEve (·) be proportional to the information
leakage meaning that fEve (W1) ≤ fEve (W2) indicates that
s is estimated from the overheard signals in z1 =GW1s+v
with higher error probability compared to z2 =GW2s+ v.
Given fEve (·), a secrecy constraint can be imposed on the
system by restricting the precoding matrix W to satisfy
fEve (W) ≤ L (13)
for some information leakage L. The RLS formulation in this
case can be modified by penalizing the RSS term with both the
power and secrecy constraints. That means W is set to
W= argmin
X∈CM×K
RSS (X) + λ Es
{
‖Xs‖2
}
+ θfEve (X) (14)
for some tunable factors λ and θ. The optimization in (14) si-
multaneously reduces the LSE at the legitimate terminals and
the leakage towards the eavesdroppers.
Deriving a function which analytically characterizes the in-
formation leakage is not a tractable task. Nevertheless, one
can consider an alternative metric which is proportional to the
capability of the eavesdroppers in decoding the information.
To find such a metric, we note that in the ideal case with sig-
nificantly narrow beamforming, we desire to have
|gTjwk| = 0, (15)
for j ∈ [J ] and k ∈ [K]. This indicates that a natural choice
for fEve (·) is
fEve (W) =
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
|gTjwk|
2 (16a)
= ‖GW‖2F = tr
{
WHGHGW
}
(16b)
By substituting (16b), (14) reduces to a convex optimization
problem whose solution is W = ψA (λ, θ) where
A (λ, θ) =
(
HHH+ θ GHG+ λ IM
)−1
HH. (17)
By restricting the transmit power to P , the secure RZF (SRZF)
precoder is concluded as
Wsrzf (λ, θ) =
√
P
βsrzf (λ, θ)
A (λ, θ) (18)
with
βsrzf (λ, θ) =
1
M
tr
{
A (λ, θ)AH (λ, θ)
}
. (19)
Note that Wsrzf (ζ, 0) =Wrzf (ζ). In fact, the SRZF scheme
utilizes the CSI of the malicious terminals and modifies RZF
beamformers, such that leakage to the eavesdroppers is further
suppressed. In general, θ and λ are tuned such that a given
performance metric, e.g. ergodic sum rate, is optimized.
IV. LARGE-SYSTEM ANALYSIS
In this section, the large-system performance of the pro-
posed precoding scheme is characterized. To this end, we con-
sider a scenario in which the number of transmit antennas M ,
number of legitimate receivers K and number of eavesdrop-
pers J are significantly large; however, the ratios
αl =
K
M
(20a)
αo =
J
M
(20b)
are constant. We refer to αl as the legitimate channel load, and
to αo as the overhearing channel load. For sake of brevity,
we further assume that
• For k ∈ [K] and j ∈ [J ], hk and gj are are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian vectors with
zero mean and variance 1/M .
• ρ2j = ρ
2 for j ∈ [J ], and σ2k = σ
2 for k ∈ [K].
To start the derivations, let us define
Q = HHH+ θ GHG+ λ IM . (21)
Hence, the k-th beamformer of the SRZF precoder reads
wk =
√
P
βsrzf (λ, θ)
Q−1h∗k . (22)
As a result, the signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR)
at legitimate receiver k reads
SINRk =
µlUk
βsrzf (λ, θ) + µlIk
. (23)
where µl := P/σ
2 is the receive signal to noise ratio (SNR)
at the legitimate terminals, and
Uk = |h
T
kQ
−1h∗k|
2, (24)
Ik =
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
|hTkQ
−1h∗j |
2. (25)
Using the Sherman-Morrison lemma, it is shown that
Uk =
(
hTkQ
−1
k h
∗
k
1 + hTkQ
−1
k h
∗
k
)2
(26a)
Ik =
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
|hTkQ
−1
k,jh
∗
j |
2
(
1 + hTkQ
−1
k h
∗
k
)2 (
1 + hTjQ
−1
k,jh
∗
j
)2 (26b)
where Qk := Q−h
∗
kh
T
k and Qk,j := Q−h
∗
kh
T
k −h
∗
jh
T
j . For
scaling factor βsrzf (λ, θ), we further can write
βsrzf (λ, θ) =
1
M
tr
{
A (λ, θ)AH (λ, θ)
}
(27a)
=
1
M
tr
{
HQ−2HH
}
(27b)
=
1
M
K∑
k=1
hTkQ
−2h∗k (27c)
⋆
=
1
M
K∑
k=1
hTkQ
−2
k h
∗
k(
1 + hTkQ
−1
k h
∗
k
)2 (27d)
where ⋆ follows from the Sherman-Morrison lemma.
For ESNRk, we can similarly write
ESNRk =
1
ρ2
‖Gwk‖
2 =
µoLk
βsrzf (λ, θ)
(28)
where µo := P/ρ
2 is the receive SNR at the eavesdroppers,
and
Lk = h
T
kQ
−1GHGQ−1h∗k (29a)
=
hTkQ
−1
k G
HGQ−1k h
∗
k(
1 + hTkQ
−1
k h
∗
k
)2 (29b)
=
1(
1 + hTkQ
−1
k h
∗
k
)2 tr {GQ−1k h∗khTkQ−1k GH} (29c)
=
1(
1 + hTkQ
−1
k h
∗
k
)2
J∑
j=1
|gjQ
−1
k h
∗
k|
2 (29d)
=
1(
1 + hTkQ
−1
k h
∗
k
)2
J∑
j=1
|gjΓ
−1
k,jh
∗
k|
2(
1 + θ gjΓ
−1
k,jg
∗
j
)2 . (29e)
Here, we define Γk,j := Q− h∗kh
T
k − θ g
∗
jg
T
j .
A. Asymptotics via Free Probability
To determine the asymptotic limits, we note that
1) Any two independent Hermitian random matrices, which
are unitarily invariant, are asymptotically free [14]. This
result indicates that
• h∗kh
T
k and Q
−1
k are asymptotically free for k ∈ [K].
• h∗kh
T
k and Q
−1
k,j are asymptotically free for k, j ∈ [K].
• h∗kh
T
k and Γ
−1
k,j are asymptotically free for k ∈ [K].
• g∗jg
T
j and Γ
−1
k,j are asymptotically free for j ∈ [J ].
2) Qk, Qk,j , and Γk,j are single-rank perturbations of Q.
As a result, the asymptotic distribution of their eigenval-
ues is similar to that of Q.
3) Defining the matrix T := HHH+ θ GHG, we have
Q = T+ λ IM . (30)
Let us denote the asymptotic distribution of the eigenval-
ues of T with pT (t). The eigenvalues of Q are shifted
versions of the eigenvalues of T and are asymptotically
distributed by pT (t− λ).
Considering the above findings, we can write
lim
M↑∞
hTkQ
−1
k h
∗
k
M
= lim
M↑∞
tr
{
Q−1k h
∗
kh
T
k
}
M
(31a)
†
= lim
M↑∞
tr
{
Q−1k
}
M
× lim
M↑∞
tr
{
h∗kh
T
k
}
M
(31b)
where † follows the fact that h∗kh
T
k and Q
−1
k are asymptoti-
cally free. Noting that
lim
M↑∞
tr
{
h∗kh
T
k
}
= lim
M↑∞
‖hk‖
2 = 1, (32)
we have
lim
M↑∞
hTkQ
−1
k h
∗
k = lim
M↑∞
1
M
tr
{
Q−1k
}
(33a)
= ET
{
1
T + λ
}
= GT (−λ) (33b)
for some T ∼ pT with Stieltjes transform GT (·) defined as
GT (s) =
∫
pT (t) dt
t− s
. (34)
Clearly, the limit does not depend on k. As a result,
Uk =
(
GT (−λ)
1 +GT (−λ)
)2
(35)
for k ∈ [K]. By same lines of derivations, we have
Ik = αl
(
1 + ET
{
1
T + λ
})−4
ET
{
1
(T + λ)
2
}
(36a)
=
αlG
′
T
(−λ)
(1 +GT (−λ))
4 , (36b)
and
βsrzf (λ, θ) =
αlG
′
T
(−λ)
(1 +GT (−λ))
2 (37a)
Lk =
αoG
′
T
(−λ)
(1 +GT (−λ))
2
(1 + θGT (−λ))
2 . (37b)
Consequently, SINRk in the large-system limit converges to
SINRasy =
µlG
2
T
(−λ) (1 +GT (−λ))
2
αlG
′
T
(−λ)
[
µl + (1 +GT (−λ))
2
] (38)
and the asymptotic limit of ESNRk is
ESNRasy =
µoαo
αl (1 + θGT (−λ))
2 . (39)
To determine this limit for particular scenarios, we further
need to determine the Stieltjes transform GT (·).
Remark 1: Note that throughout the derivations, we did not
utilize the Gaussianity of the channel matrices. In fact, the
results in (38) and (39) are valid for any unitarily invariantH
and G whose row vectors are jointly independent.
B. Stieltjes Transform of T
To find the Stieltjes Transform of T, we rewrite T as
T = H˜HDH˜ (40)
where H˜ is defined as
H˜ := [h1, . . . ,hK ,g1, . . . ,gJ ]
T, (41)
and D ∈ R(K+J)×(K+J) is a diagonal matrix whose first K
diagonal entries are one and the rest are θ. Noting that H˜
fulfills the conditions for the deformed quarter circle law, one
can invoke the Silverstein-Bai result [15], [16] and write
GT (s) =
1
−s+ (αl + αo)
∫
ypD (y) dy
1 + yGT (s)
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Fig. 1: Average ergodic secrecy rate vs. the overhearing channel load.
The simulations are given for M = 128 and log µl = log µo = 0
dB. For SRZF precoding, λ = θ = 1, and ζ = 1 in RZF.
where pD (·) denotes the distributions of the diagonal entries
of D and reads
pD (y) =
αl
αl + αo
δ (y − 1) +
αo
αl + αo
δ (y − θ) . (43)
Substituting into (42), we finally conclude
1 + sGT (s) = αl
GT (s)
1 +GT (s)
+ αo
θGT (s)
1 + θGT (s)
(44)
By taking derivative from the both sides of this equation, we
further conclude
G′
T
(s) =
GT (s)
−s+
αl
(1 +GT (s))
2 +
θαo
(1 + θGT (s))
2
. (45)
As a result, GT (−λ) is found as the positive solution of
λ+
αl
1 + x
+
θαo
1 + θx
=
1
x
(46)
and G′
T
(−λ) is calculated by
G′
T
(−λ) =
x
λ+
αl
(1 + x)
2 +
θαo
(1 + θx)
2
. (47)
By standard lines of derivations, one can show that the results
recover the earlier derivations in [2], [12].
V. NUMERICAL INVESTIGATIONS
To investigate the performance of the proposed precoding
scheme and validate the analytic derivations, we study sample
scenarios via numerical simulations. As an overall measure of
performance, we define the average ergodic secrecy rate as
R¯ =
1
K
K∑
k=1
E {Rk} . (48)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
1
2
3
4
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SRZF Simulations
RZF Simulations
Asymptotic Lomit
Fig. 2: Optimized average ergodic secrecy rate vs. the overhearing
channel load. The simulations are given for M = 128. The results
are sketched for log µl = log µo = 0 dB and αl = 0.0625.
Following the asymptotic analysis, as M grows large, Rk →
E {Rk} and E {Rk} → R¯ for k ∈ [K]. Thus,
lim
M↑∞
R¯ =
[
log
(
1 + SINRasy
1 + ESNRasy
)]+
. (49)
To validate the large-system results, we sketch in Fig. 1 the
average ergodic secrecy rate against the overhearing channel
load αo for two scenarios; namely, a scenario with high user
density, i.e. αl = 0.5, and a scenario with low user density,
i.e. αl = 0.0625. In both scenarios, the SNR at all receive
terminals is set to one, i.e. logµl = logµo = 0 dB. For
sake of comparison, the results are given for both the SRZF
and RZF schemes, where in the SRZF precoder λ = θ = 1,
and in RZF ζ = 1. The entries of H and G are generated
i.i.d. with CN (0, 1/M). The figure shows the simulations for
M = 128 transmit antennas, as well as the results given via
asymptotic analyses. It is seen that the analytic derivations are
tightly consistent with the simulation results. From the figure,
it is further observed that for the given setting the proposed
scheme is constantly outperforming RZF. This observation
however needs further investigations, as in this setting the
tunable parameters, i.e. λ and θ, are kept fixed.
A. Optimal Tuning of SRZF Precoding
Following the tight consistency of analytical results, seen in
Fig. 1, we tune the SRZF precoder by optimizing the asymp-
totic limit of the average ergodic secrecy rate. In other words,
for a given setting, we find λ and θ such that the limiting value
of R¯, given in (49), is maximized. We denote this maximum
value with R¯Opt.
Fig. 2 shows R¯Opt versus the overhearing channel load for
the low user density scenario in Fig. 1. The optimal choice of
λ and θ, as well as the optimal RZF regularizer, is found at
each point by maximizing the asymptotic limit in (49). The
−8 −6 −4 −2 0 2 4 6 8
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4
αl = 2αo = 0.5
αl = 2αo = 0.0625
logµo in [dB]
R¯
O
p
t
SRZF Simulations
RZF Simulations
Asymptotic Limit
Fig. 3: Optimized average ergodic secrecy rate vs. the receive SNR
at the eavesdroppers. The simulations are given for M = 128 and
log µl = 0 dB.
simulation points are then calculated by simulating the system
with optimally tuned parameters for M = 128.
Considering Fig. 2, two findings are demonstrated: 1) For
non-zero overhearing channel loads, the SRZF scheme con-
stantly outperforms RZF. This finding is intuitive, since for
αo 6= 0, the so-called secrecy-for-free property, reported in
[6], does not hold anymore, and hence, further suppression
of leakage by SRZF enhances the performance. 2) The gap
between the secrecy rates achieved by SRZF and RZF increase
as αo grows. This observation comes from the fact that as in
networks with high density of eavesdroppers, beamforming
based on the legitimate channel information results in high
information leakage, and hence modification of the beamform-
ers based on the eavesdropper channel improves the secrecy
performance considerably.
B. Robustness of SRZF Precoding
To study the further gains proposed by the SRZF scheme,
we plot the optimized average ergodic secrecy rate against
the receive SNR at the eavesdroppers, i.e. µo, for the two
scenarios, considered in Fig. 1, when αo = αl/2. In this
figure, logµl = 0 dB, and logµo is swept between −8 and 8
dB. The figure depicts that the average secrecy rate achieved
by the RZF scheme drops significantly, as the receive SNR
at the eavesdroppers increases. The SRZF scheme however is
very robust. This phenomena demonstrates the efficiency of
beamforming modification proposed by SRZF and indicates
its robustness against the quality of eavesdroppers’ channels.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
A novel linear precoding scheme has been proposed for
downlink transmission in MIMOME channels. A closed-form
expression for the asymptotic achievable secrecy rate per user
has been derived for this precoder. The large-system results
depict tight consistency with simulations, and hence can be
employed to tune the precoder. Numerical investigations have
demonstrated high performance enhancements achieved by the
proposed scheme. Specifically, the precoder has shown to be
highly robust against the change in the channel quality and
outperform significantly the well-known RZF scheme when
the eavesdroppers experience better channel quality compared
to the legitimate receivers.
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